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Surviving Judicial Activism in the Tenth
Circuit: An Analysis of
Berry v. City of Muskogee
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a well established legal principle that a court of law
must have authority in order to adjudicate a particular action. 1
A court's authority to adjudicate an issue is non-existent if a
party does not have standing to sue. 2 A deceased person did
not have standing to sue at common law. 3 Today, state statutes goveming the survival of actions and the parties who may
bring those actions provide standing to sue and mitigate the
harsh common law rule that a person's cause of action always
terminated upon death. 4 To decide whether or not a civil rights
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 survives, federal law
provides that courts apply the state law wherein the claim was
brought. 6
The Tenth Circuit addressed the survivability and damages
applicable when a § 1983 civil rights claim is alleged in Berry
v. City of Muskogee 7 • This note will analyze the Berry decision
and compare the Tenth Circuit approach to the survivability of
§ 1983 claims with that of other jurisdictions and the Supreme

L
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
2.
New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1346-47 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 49fi U.S. 947 (1990).
:1.
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 69a, 702 n.14, reh'g denied, 412 U.S.
963 (1973).
4.
ld.; see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. fi84, fi89 (1978); Cunningham v.
Ray, 648 F.2d 118fi, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981).
fi.
Section 1988 states,
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 198:3 (1984).
6.
42 U.S.C. § 1988. For cases applying state law under § 1988, see infra n.16
and accompanying text.
7.
900 F.2d 1489 (lOth Cir. 1990).
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Court. Part II of this note will provide a review of the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Berry. Part III will survey other decisions
regarding the survivability of§ 1983 actions. Part IV will compare the Tenth Circuit's decision in Berry with the decisions
surveyed in part III. This note concludes that the Tenth
Circuit's Berry decision contradicts federal law and Supreme
Court precedent and therefore should be overturned.
II.

BACKGROUND

Mark Berry was a prisoner in the Muskogee City Federal
jail. While in prison, fellow inmates murdered Berry. In Berry
v. City of Muskogee, Berry's widow brought a§ 1983 civil rights
action against the City of Muskogee in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. 8 At trial the
defendant, City of Muskogee, objected to an application of
Oklahoma's wrongful death statute as the proper source of
authority for an award of damages. 9 The trial court overruled
this objection and used the damages available under
Oklahoma's wrongful death statute to instruct the jury. 10
Judgment was entered against the City and the City appealed
claiming, inter alia, that the measure of damages should be
calculated according to Oklahoma's survival statute pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.n
In considering which statutory measure of damages was
appropriate, the Tenth Circuit had to decide two things: 1)
whether this was a survival or wrongful death action, and 2)
whether the damages should be based on a state survival statute, wrongful death statute, or "whether damages are determined by some federal standard either as a survival or wrongful death-type action not defined or limited by state law." 12
In deciding these two issues, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 contains a three step process for
resolving areas of ambiguity or deficiency in the civil rights
statutes. 13 First, § 1988 14 directs courts to look at the federal

H.
9.
10.
11.
12.
1a.
14.

!d. at 1506.
!d. at 1500.
[d.

!d.
!d. at 1501.
Id. at 1502.
Section l9RR provides in pertinent part,
"in all cases where the [federal law] is not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies . . . the
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law; second, if the federal law is "deficient," the courts are to
apply the law of the state where the claim is brought; and
third, the courts are to reject the state law if it is "inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 15
Applying the first step of § 1988, the Tenth Circuit looked
to the federal law and concluded that this was a survival action. 16 The court reasoned that § 1983 states that liability is
"to the party injured." 17 The deceased is the injured party and
therefore, the person who has the cause of action. 18
The Tenth Circuit then turned its attention to the issue of
which statutory authority for an award of damages should
apply. The court concluded that "Congress envisioned a significant remedy for wrongful killings resulting from conduct proscribed by § 1983 but did not provide specific guidance regarding whether that would be realized under a federal law or state
survival action or by other means." 19 Thus, following § 1988's
second step, the court tumed to the Oklahoma statute regarding survival actions and decided this statute contradicted federal law. 2° Federal law is contradicted when the direct language
of the Constitution or federal statute is impeded or when the
purpose of the federal law is undermined. 21 The purposes of§
1983 are the prevention of abuses of power by those acting
under color of state law and compensation of persons injured by
deprivation of federal rights. 22 The court held that applying
the Oklahoma survival statute would "provide extraordinarily

common law, as modified by the constitution and statutes of the state
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and
lawR of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause . . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 19RH (19R4).
lfi.
ld.; see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 4;~6 U.S. 584, 590-591 (197H); Berry,
900 F.2d at 1504-1507 (lOth Cir. 1990); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734,
7aH (11th Cir. 19H9), reh/{ denied, 871 F.2d 122 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 817, appeal after remand, 931 F.2d 811 (11th Cir. 1991); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739
F.2d 239, 24;~ (6th Cir. 1984); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1240 (7th
Cir. 1984).
16.
Berry, 900 F.2d at 1506-07.
17.
ld. at 1507.
lR.
ld.
19.
ld. at 150:~.
20.
ld. at 1506-07.
21.
RobertRon v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. fi84, 590 (1978); see Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 69:1, 703 (1973).
22.
Berry, 900 F.2d at lfiO;~; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590, 591; see also Carey v.
Piphus, 4:i5 U.S. 247, 254 (197R).
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limited recovery, possibly only damages to property loss, of
which there were none, and loss of decedent's earnings between
the time of injury and death, of which there also were none."23
Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that the Oklahoma survival
statute was deficient in its "remedy and deterrent effect."24
The Tenth Circuit then considered whether the trial court
was correct in applying Oklahoma's wrongful death statute. 25
The court found that although applying the state wrongful
death statute in this case would meet the purposes of § 1983,
other state statutes might not be adequate. 26 The Court
feared that applying the state law in this case would lead to a
defeat of § 1983's purposes in future cases. 27 The Tenth Circuit rejected an award of damages under Oklahoma's wrongful
death statute, reasoning that to do otherwise leaves the issue
of damages and survival in § 1983 cases entirely in the hands
of the states. 28 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, federal
damages must be created. 29 The court decided the damages
that would apply would be punitive and compensatory, including "medical and burial expenses, pain and suffering before
death, loss of earnings based upon the probable duration of the
victim's life had not the injury occurred, the victim's loss of
consortium, and other damages recognized in common law tort
actions." 30
III.

SURVIVABILITY OF A§ 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM

The federal courts have generally followed § 1988's three
step process and applied state law when survivability becomes
an issue in § 1983 civil rights claims. This generally leads to
three results: 1) the courts find that the statute allows survival, or 2) the courts find the statute does not allow survival, but
is consistent with federal law, or 3) the courts find the statute
does not allow survival and is inconsistent with federal law.

23.
Berry, 900 F.2d at lii04.
!d.
24.
2ii.
!d.
26.
!d. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit found that wrongful death damages were
not a new action under Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) because
applying the wrongful death statute would simply be assisting in the remedial
purposes of § 19R3. Berry, 900 F.2d at lii04-0ii.
Berry, 900 F.2d at lii06.
27.
2R.
!d. at lii06.
29.
!d. at lii06-07.
:~o.
!d. at lii07.
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A. Courts Finding That State Law Allowed Survival of
§ 1983 Claims

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
Brazier v. Cherry, 31 applied § 1988's three step process and
looked to Georgia's survival statute. 32 In Brazier the
defendant's police officers allegedly beat the decedent to death
after wrongfully arresting him. 33 The decedent's widow
brought suit as administratrix of decedent's estate. 34 The
court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and
explained that, although according to the common law claims
for injury to the person die with the victim, "amelioration of
the harshness of this principle must come from legislation."35
The court, pursuant to § 1988, applied Georgia's survival statute and held that the civil rights claim survived. 36
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that California's survival statute allowed the survival of civil rights claims in Smith
v. City of Fontana. 37 Following§ 1988's three step process, the
court applied the state law which the court interpreted to allow
the survival of a § 1983 civil rights claim. 38

B. Courts Finding that State Statutes which Prohibit
Survival of§ 1983 Claims are Consistent with Federal Law
The United States Supreme Court in Robertson v.
Wegmann 39 addressed the survival issue, and concluded that
the survival of § 1983 claims was not imperative. In Robertson,
the plaintiff brought a civil rights claim under § 1983,40 but
died before the case went to trial. 41 The district court denied
defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the action abated on
plaintiffs death. 42 The district court reasoned that following §
31.
293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
ld. at 407 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-505, 105-1302 (Michie Supp. 1958)).
32.
33.
Brazier, 293 F.2d at 402.
ld.
34.
35.
ld. at 403.
36.
!d. at 407.
37.
818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp.
1986)).
38.
ld. at 1416.
39.
486 U.S. 584 (1978).
ld. at 586.
40.
41.
ld.
42.
ld. at 587. Louisiana law allowed an action like decedents to survive only
in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings of which the decedent had none.
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1988's three-step process and applying Louisiana's survival
statute would lead to the abatement of plaintiffs civil rights
claim which would be inconsistent with the purposes of §
1983. 43 Thus, the district court created "a federal common law
of survival in civil rights actions in favor of the personal representative of the deceased."44
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that applying Louisiana law would cause the action to abate which
would be inconsistent with § 1983's purposes. 45 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that a federal law of survival would advance the
§ 1983 policies and provide uniformity in the application of civil
rights laws. 46 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.47
The Supreme Court first outlined the principles which
govern the survival of a § 1983 civil rights claim. Those principles include § 1988's three step process, 48 which as explained
above are: 1) look at the federal law; 2) if the federal law is
deficient look to the state law wherein the suit is brought; and
3) the state law cannot contradict federal law. The Supreme
Court recognized that federal law does not cover the survival of
a § 1983 civil rights claim, and thus, application of state law is
appropriate so long as the state law is not inconsistent with
federal law or the purposes of federallaw. 49
Applying these general principles Justice Marshall writing
for the majority concluded that, "[d]espite the broad sweep of§
1983, we can find nothing in the statute or its underlying policies to indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of
absolute survivorship."50 The Court supported this conclusion
reasoning that Louisiana's statute is not inconsistent with the
compensation and deterrence policies of§ 1983. 51 The policy of
compensating the decedent for violation of his civil rights is

tA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 281fi (West 1971).
48.
44.

affd,
rev'd
4fi.
46.
47.
48.
49.
fiO.
fil.

Robertson, 486 U.S. at fiH7.
!d. (quoting Shaw v. Garrison, 891 F. Supp. 18fi:c!, l:-l6H (E.D. La. 197fi)
fi4fi F.2d 9HO (fith Cir. 1977), n•hf.r denied, fififi F.2d 1:191, cert. pranted and
by Robertson v. Wegmann, 486 U.S. fi04 (1978)).
!d. at fiH7-R
!d. at fiHH.
4:14 U.S.

91-1;~

!d.
!d. at fii-19-90.
!d. at fi90.
!d.

(1977).
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moot because the decedent is dead. Justice Marshall stated
that "[ t]he goal of compensating those injured by a deprivation
of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation of one
who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased's estate."52
As for the policy of deterrence, the Supreme Court ruled
that, given the amount and types of claims which do survive
under Louisiana law, there is little reason to think officials will
not be deterred from violating § 1983 at least when there is no
claim that the illegal conduct caused death. 53 In response to
the plaintiffs concern that § 1983 is a unique federal remedy,
the Supreme Court stated that,
[because] a federal remedy should be available, however, does
not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff ... must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the state law to which § 1988
refers us. A state statute cannot be considered "inconsistent"
with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. 54

While the Court left open the question of whether or not a
civil rights claim survived when the act giving rise to the cause
of action was also the cause of death, the Court was unequivocal in its assertion that § 1988 should be implemented and
abatement alone did not justify ignoring the state law. 55
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
followed the Supreme Court in Parkerson v. Carrouth, 56 and
found that the Arkansas survival statute did not permit the
survival of § 1983 claims. 57 In Parkerson, the decedent died
after filing a § 1983 claim against the defendants. 58 The cause
of death was unrelated to the § 1983 claim. The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the compensation and deterence policies of §

52.
RobPrtson, 4::!6 U.S. at .'i92(footnote ommitted); see Parkerson v. Carrouth,
7R2 F.2d 1449, 1455 (8th Cir. 1986); Bowling v. Oldham, 758 F. Supp. fi88, 590
(M.D.N.C. 1990); Jones v. George, fi8:l F. Supp. 1293, 130fi (S.D.W. Va. 1982);
Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So.2d 207, 211 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1001
(19R5).
53.
Robertson, 486 U.S. at 591-2 (citing LA. C!V. CODE ANN. art. 231fi (West
1971) which provides for the survival of most actions including defamation and
malicious prosecution).
54.
Id. at 593.
55.
Id. at fi93-94.
56.
782 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1986).
fi7.
ld. at 14fi0 (interpreting ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (Michie 1991)).
58.
ld.

90
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1983 were met under Arkansas law. 59 The court explained
that persons violating § 1983 would have little reason to believe the plaintiff would die, and thus, abating the claim would
not defeat § 1983's deterrence policies. 60
Other courts have applied the Supreme Court's analysis
and held that § 1983 claims do not survive even when the act
giving rise to the cause of action caused the death. In Jones v.
George 61 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia found that the plaintiffs civil rights
claims on behalf of the decedent did not survive under West
Virginia's survival statute. 62
Upon so finding the district court considered whether or
not this statute was inconsistent with federal law. The Court in
Jones found that abatement when a civil rights action has
caused death would, in general, defeat the purposes of §
1983. 63 However, relying on Robertson and Carlson, 64 the
court reasoned that the claim should not survive if "the law
applicable to viable claims joined with the personal injury
claims satisfies that philosophy and those policies as they apply
to the personal injury claims."65 The district court in Jones
found that West Virginia's wrongful death law "suffice[s] to
meet the § 1983 'deterrence of official misconduct' policy ....
The potential damages in a West Virginia wrongful death action are broad by category and notably include punitive damages."66 Therefore, the district court resolved
the question of "whether abatement based on state law could
be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal
rights caused death" [citation omitted] as "yes" in situations
like the instant one, in which wrongful death claims are also
pleaded and where the state law covering such claims is not,
as analyzed and found herein, "inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States."67

fi9.
60.
61.
62.
68.
64.
6fi.
66.
67.

ld. at 1454-fi5.
ld. at 14fi4.
fi33 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D. W. Va. 1982).
ld. at 1801 (citing W. VA. CODE § fifi-7-8a(a)).
ld. at l::!Ofi-06.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
Jane~;, fi88 F. Supp. at 1304.
ld. at 1:~05.
Id. at 180fi-06 (quoting Robertson, 486 U.S. at fi94).
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Similarly, the Louisiana Court of Appeals, in Ascani v.
Hughes, found that under Louisiana law an estate could not
bring a civil rights claim and held that Louisiana's wrongful
death statute satisfied § 1983's deterrence policy. 68 Thus, the
court in Ascani reasoned that applying state law to the
abatement of plaintiffs § 1983 claim did not defeat § 1983's
policies. 69

Courts Finding that State Statutes which Prohibit
Survival are Inconsistent with Federal Law.

C.

In Bell v. Milwaukee, 10 the Seventh Circuit found that
because the state law would not permit the plaintiffs § 1983
claim to survive, the law was inconsistent with the policies of§
1983. 71 Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that in order "to
deter officials from committing violations of constitutional
rights that result in death of the victim . . . [the decedent's
estate] has a § 1983 claim for loss of life notwithstanding inhospitable Wisconsin law.'172
Similarly, in Jaco v. Bloechle, 73 the Sixth Circuit found
that Ohio's survival statute does not permit the survival of the
decedents civil rights action when death was instantaneous. 74
The court then concluded that this statute was inconsistent
with the deterrent purposes of § 1983. 75 Therefore, the court
decided to "implement congressional intent by allowing survival."76
The above cases exemplify three possible outcomes when
applying § 1988. Regardless of the accuracy of the courts' interpretations of the state law in these cases, or others coming to
similar conclusions, the courts do attempt to follow the procedure outlined in § 1988. While the Tenth Circuit in Berry

68.
470 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. Ct. App. 19Rfi).
69.
!d. at 211; see Bowling v. Oldham, 7fi3 F. Supp. fiRR (M.D.N.C. 1990) (re·
fusing to follow Berry, holding that in a § 19R3 suit North Carolina's wrongful
death statute provides adequate relief for the estate of the deceased, and finding
that the policy of preventing abuses of power by state officials is satisfied by the
availability of punitive damages).
70.
7411 F.2d 120fi (7th Cir. 19R4).
71.
!d. at 1236.
72.
!d. at 12::lR.
78.
7:19 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 19R4).
74.
Jacu, 7:19 F.2d at 242 (citing OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 2805.216 (Anderson
1981)).
75.
!d. at 244.
76.
!d. at 244-fi.

92
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reached the same conclusion as some of those mentioned above,
the Tenth Circuit did not follow the same process. The Tenth
Circuit found that the Oklahoma survival statute supplemented with the Oklahoma wrongful death statute would meet the
purposes of § 1983. 77 However, the court reasoned that because the § 1988 procedure might occasionally lead to nonsurvival or inconsistent results, the court should, in the interest of uniformity, create a standard survival action with specific damages. 7x

IV.

A.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN Berry v. City of Muskogee
CONTRADICTS FEDERAL LAW AND PRIOR
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The Tenth Circuit Contradicts Federal Law

The Tenth Circuit in Berry contradicts the United States
Supreme Court and federal law. The Tenth Circuit reasoned
that:
In considering whether the purposes of§ 1983 are satisfied by
adoption of state survival and wrongful death actions, we
must consider that different states will define them differently, thus requiring individual analyses of each state's law. We
might have to find that a state's law works satisfactorily in
some instances, as when there are surviving dependents, but
not in other cases, as when there is no one with a right to
sue. 79

Thus, the Tenth Circuit hypothesized that in some instances
state law might be insufficient to satisfy the purposes of §
1983, and because of that possibility concluded that "the federal courts must fashion a federal remedy to be applied to § 1983
death cases."80 This remedy included the survivability of §
1983 claims and a list of damages available under§ 1983. 81
The Tenth Circuit ostensibly adopts the three step process
of § 1988 concluding that Oklahoma's survival statute supplemented by Oklahoma's wrongful death statute would allow the
survival of the § 1983 claim in Oklahoma and meet § 1983
policies. The court stated "[ w ]e believe that the 'new' cause of

77.
7H.
79.
80.
81.

Berry, 900 F.2d at 1fi06.
ld. at 1506-07.
Berry. 900 F.2d at 1fi06.
ld.
ld. at 1506-07.
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action theory [i.e., § 1983 as applied by the Tenth Circuit,]
would not warrant rejection of state wrongful death remedies
as appropriate to vindicate § 1983 violations when death results."82 Therefore, unlike the courts in Jaco and Bell, the
Tenth Circuit did not find that state law contradicted federal
law. 83 However, the Tenth Circuit, reasoned that other states
might not have amenable laws and therefore uniformity in
result would be impossible. 84 Thus, unlike the courts in Robertson, Parkerson and Jones, the Tenth Circuit did not apply
the state law as § 1988 requires. 85 The court simply bypassed
that aspect of* 1988 and under the banner of uniformity created a survival claim and federal damages to accompany civil
rights claims. 86
Uniformity should not override the dictates of§ 1988. The
United States Supreme Court, in referring to the survivability
of§ 1983 actions, has stated that states have an interest in the
civil liability of their officials, and thus, deference should be
paid to the state laws when enforcing § 1983 claims. 87 The
Tenth Circuit fails to realize that while there is a lack of uniformity in result, the correct application of § 1988 leads to
uniformity in procedure. 88 Congress in passing § 1988 has determined that uniformity in procedure and state deference are
to take priority over uniformity of result. The Tenth Circuit
clearly ignored this congressional preference.
In creating a "federal remedy to be applied to § 1983 death
cases,"89 the Tenth Circuit oversteps "the function of the judiciary into the domain of the legislature."9 ° Chief Justice
Rehnquist has stated, "absent a clear indication from Congress,
federal courts lack the authority to grant damages relief for
constitutional violations."91 The courts cannot create common-

R2.
ld. at 1fi0fi.
83.
See supra part III.C.
R4.
Berry, 900 F.2d at 1fi06 (stating that the "[a]pplication of state law, at
least in some instances, will be inconsistent with the predominance of the federal
interest").
R5.
See supra part III.B.
86.
Berry, 900 F.2d at 1506·07.
R7.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, n.ll (1980).
Rl:l.
Bowling v. Oldham, 7.'i.'3 F. Supp. Fi88, Fi91 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
R9.
Berry, 900 F.2d at 1.'i06.
90.
Bowling v. Oldham, 7.'i3 F. Supp . .'i88, 591 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (specifically
rejecting Gilmere, Jaco and Berry).
91.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 41 (1980) (Justice Rehnquist dissenting
opinion).

94
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law rights or federal common law. 92 The Tenth Circuit's creation of a federal survival action and damages for § 1983 cases
amends § 1988 and usurps legislative authority.
The Tenth Circuit relied on Smith v. Wade 93 and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura 94 as a basis for
creating federal common law for § 1983 actions. 95 The Court,
in Smith and Stachura did not create new law. It simply applied the federal common law applicable when § 1983 was
passed in 1871, "with such modification or adaptation as might
be necessary to carry out the purpose and policy of[§ 1983]."96
In essence, the Supreme Court in these cases never got past
the first prong of§ 1988 in applying federal law. Certainly, the
Supreme Court's modification of existing common law is distinguishable from the Tenth Circuit's creation of new common
law.

The Tenth Circuit Contradicts the United States
Supreme Court

B.

The Tenth Circuit, by ruling that a state law can never
cause a § 1983 claim to abate, contradicts the United States
Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit explains that if courts apply
state survival statutes the courts may "have to find that a
state's law works in some instances, as when there are surviving dependents, but not in other cases, as when there is no
one with the right to sue."97 Yet, the Supreme Court has
found that a state survival statute should be applied pursuant
to § 1988 even when the result is abatement. 98 The Supreme
Court has said that "[d]espite the broad sweep of § 1983, we
can find nothing in the statute or its underlying policies to
indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular
action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship."99 Additionally, the Supreme Court explained that,

92.
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, an U.S. 647, 6fi1 (1968); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
:304 U.S. 64 (198R); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1Rfi0).
93.
461 U.S. :m (19R8).
94.
4 77 U.S. 299 (1986).
9fi.
Berry, 900 F.2d at lfi06.
Smith, 461 U.S. at :14.
96.
97.
ld. at lfi06.
9R.
Robertson v. Wegmann, 4:36 U.S. fiR4, 591-92 (197R).
99.
ld. at fi90.
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[simply because] a federal remedy should be available, however, does not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff (or his representative) must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the
state law to which § 1988 refers us. A state statute cannot be
considered "inconsistent" with federal law merely because the
statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If the success
of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be
no reason at all to look to state law .... 100

While the Court was careful to distinguish this action, in which
the decedent's death was unrelated to the civil rights violation,
from one in which the decedent's death was caused by the civil
rights violation, clearly the language of the Supreme Court
leans toward a more rigid application of§ 1988 than the Tenth
Circuit applied in Berry.
The Tenth Circuit also contradicts the Supreme Court by
finding that § 1983 is a survival action. The Tenth Circuit
relied upon § 1983's direction that relief should go "to the party
injured" to conclude that the action in Berry should be a survival action. 101 The Tenth Circuit does not explain how the
phrase "to the party injured" creates a survival action or gives
the deceased standing to sue. In fact, the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that this is a survival action contradicts the United
States Supreme Court's finding in 1978 that "one specific area
not covered by federal law is that relating to 'the survival of
civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the
plaintiff or defendant." 102 A more reasonable interpretation of
the phrase "to the party injured" is that whatever action is
available, whether survival or wrongful death, it is only available to the "party injured." It appears that the federal law is
deficient as to just what type of claim this is, and therefore,
following § 1988's second step, the court should look to the
state statute.
In Berry, under Oklahoma's statute, a decedent's civil
rights claims do not survive his death. Oklahoma law states
that only those actions which survive at common law and
"causes of actions for mesne profits, or for an injury to the
person, or to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or fraud,

100.
Id. at fi93.
101.
Berry, 900 F.2d at 1506-07; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
102.
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (quoting Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 692, 702 n.14 (1973)).
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shall also survive; and the action may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the
same." 103 At least one court has held that, applying § 1988's
three step approach, a civil rights action would not survive in
Oklahoma. 104 In Black v. Cook 105 the United States District
Court for the Westem District of Oklahoma held that since the
Oklahoma statute goveming survival and abatement of actions
does not provide for the survival of an action to recover damages for violation of a decedent's civil rights, the plaintiffs lack
standing to sue for the alleged violation of their son's civil
rights even though their son died as a result of the violation.106
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in other cases
would seem to forbid the survival of civil rights actions under
Oklahoma law. The Tenth Circuit has held that because libel,
slander, defamation and invasion of privacy actions did not
survive at common law and were not specifically mentioned
under New Mexico's survival statute which contains wording
similar to Oklahoma's, such claims did not survive. 107 By
analogy, a civil rights action does not survive at common law
and is not mentioned in Oklahoma's survival statute, thus a
civil rights action should not survive.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit in Berry has created a survival action
and specific damages in § 1983 civil rights claims. This judicial
creation contradicts federal law and the Supreme Court. While
the Tenth Circuit's results in Berry may be desirable, the
means with which the Tenth Circuit obtained their results undermines both the legislative process and representative government. Extending the Tenth Circuit's analysis, a Court could
easily create any amendment to any statute simply by finding
that in some cases, though not the one at bar, the outcome
might contradict the statute's purposes. On a practical level
overturning Berry would allow courts to apply§ 1988 appropriately, giving states some control over the financial liability of

108.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § lOfil (West 1984).
Black v. Cook, 444 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
104.
444 F. Supp. 61 (D. Okla. 1977).
lOfi.
106.
ld.
107.
Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., :342 F.2d 77fi, 776 (lOth Cir. 196fi) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-7-1 (now N.M. STAT. ANN. § 87-2-1 (Michie 1978))).

83]

SURVIVAL ACTIONS UNDER § 1983

97

their officials. 108 On a larger, and perhaps more important
level, overturning Berry would restore meaning and representation to the legislative process.
Ned S. Fuller

108.
Moreover, overturning Berry would not necessarily mean that plaintiffs have
no claim for relief in cases in which the § 1988 action does not survive the
victim's death. Plaintiffs would still be entitled to sue in most states, under common law or statutory tort actions. However, plaintiffs would lose the generous
attorney fee advantage allocated them under § l9R8.

